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To both understand and to improve different areas of the law, it
is important to recognize what drives policymakers to apply laws to
help order relationships between various parties rather than leaving
them to their own devices. For instance, securities law often uses
increased disclosure as a regulatory tool of choice.' Importantly,
securities law does so because of basic assumptions about how
markets work; more specifically, this mode of operation for
securities law reflects a belief that information can be incorporated
into securities prices, making those prices more accurate and more
likely to encourage trading at fair price levels. The notion of an
"efficient market hypothesis" classically informs an important
interaction of economic theory, legal theory, and policy making in
this regard.2  Accordingly, if parties to transactions, including
investors, have access to information through improved disclosures
* Associate Professor, The University of Alabama School of Law. Prior to
entering the legal academy, I served as a Special Counsel at the United States
Securities and Exchange Commission, where among other matters I worked on
broker-dealer regulation. I would like to thank Professor Alan Palmiter, the
staff of the Wake Forest Law Review, and participants in the Law Review's
symposium on agency theory for encouraging and engaging in an important
discussion of agency theory. I also thank my faculty colleagues and the
Alabama Law School Foundation for their support of my research.
1. At the most elementary level, this is exemplified by basic requirements
such as the frequent need for the filing of information-filled registration
statements as part of the securities offering process. See Securities Act of 1933
§ 5, 15 U.S.C. § 77e (2006). Such requirements over time grew to include more
continuous reporting requirements, including annual and other periodic
company reports under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934. See The Laws
That Govern the Securities Industry, U.S. SEC. & EXCHANGE COMMISSION,
http://www.sec.gov/about/laws.shtml#secexactl934 (last visited June 9, 2013).
And, as policymakers addressed new crises of confidence, additional disclosure
requirements were added, as exemplified by provisions in statutes such as the
Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002. See id.
2. See JAMEs D. COX ET AL., SECURITIES REGULATION: CASES AND MATERIALS
103-06 (6th ed. 2009).
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and markets are efficient at absorbing information, hopefully the
parties will be better enabled to enter transactions at the proper
prices, which will encourage confidence and further participation in
those markets. Thus, legal policy behind improving disclosure and
encouraging participation and confidence might facilitate other
important goals, such as improving the ability to raise capital and to
sustain securities markets through such participation. Certainly,
the notion of an efficient market hypothesis is not accepted as
absolutely accurate by all parties,3 yet it is hard to imagine
understanding securities policy today without at least taking the
notion into account. 4
To draw a parallel to the foundation of securities law and policy
in theories of efficient markets, modern agency theory and its
recognition of problems associated with agency relationships and
agency costs long have driven the nature of business law. Agency
theory helps drive how law has chosen to create rules related to
corporate governance and other business-related issues. For
instance, since a corporation traditionally separates ownership from
control of operations, one must be concerned with the motivation of
the individual employees who run the firm as agents and might not
always fully share the interests of the owner shareholders. Analysis
of such issues in the fields of legal, finance, and economic theory to
create a modern notion of agency theory certainly have informed
policy.5  Scholars such as Harvard Business School Professor
Michael Jensen have played a significant role in furthering our
understanding of the agency problem and its effect on businesses.6
Yet, in a time of financial crisis, agency theory as it intersects
with business may become less attractive as the understandings
behind the theory that informed public policies failed to prevent
losses associated with the crisis. This allows some to provocatively
question if perhaps modern agency theory has had its day.7
Interestingly, even important scholars of agency theory, such as
3. Various gradations of the hypothesis have been proffered from weak to
strong, while some more fundamentally question its associated notions of
investor behavior. See id. at 103-13.
4. See id. at 103 (quoting Gilson & Kraakman, The Mechanisms of Market
Efficiency, 70 VA. L. REV. 549, 549-50 (1984)).
5. For instance, while shareholders may not control a corporation's
operations, they possess corrective powers, such as derivative litigation and
proxy voting, which influence the course of a firm led astray by its employees.
6. See generally, e.g., Michael C. Jensen & William H. Meckling, Theory of
the Firm: Managerial Behavior, Agency Costs and Ownership Structure, 3 J.
FIN. ECON. 305 (1976) (using theories of agency, property rights, and finance to
explain the impact of agency costs on the structure of the firm).
7. Such questions inform the subject of the Wake Forest Law Review's
2013 business law symposium. Symposium, Agency Theory: Still Viable?, 48
WAKE FOREST L. REV. 567 (2013).
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Professor Jensen, are offering new ways, such as integrity, to order
behavior associated with firms and organizations. 8 However, it
would be premature to call agency theory dead. Indeed, a renewed
examination of and emphasis on the roots of agency law that
predate modern expositions on agency theory and business seem
especially timely.
While economic analysis of agency relationships and their effect
on businesses has been significant in recent decades, concerns about
agency problems and their relation to law are not new. Traditional
agency law has long provided legal analysis and redress of issues
that today might be characterized as agency costs. The
commentaries of Harvard Professor (later Justice) Joseph Story, for
example, included the study of agency law in relation to maritime
and commercial jurisprudence.9  More recently, in the early
twentieth century, University of Michigan Professor Floyd Mechem
outlined agency law in terms of its fundamental components linked
to the creation of agency and, perhaps even more importantly, to the
duties that needed to be found between agents, principals, and third
parties in relation to agency. 10 Although agency courses still exist
today, the current number of offerings and student participants may
not adequately reflect the importance traditionally placed on
understanding agency concepts as part of a legal education.11
In this Article, I explore revisiting traditional agency law in a
particular context-the financial services field. Organizations
involving financial intermediaries in the financial services industry
are of special interest given their link to the economy and the level
of scrutiny placed on the industry in the wake of various scandals
and the financial crisis. Moreover, these organizations are
noteworthy for the importance of agency-type relationships to them.
8. See, e.g., Michael Jensen, Keynote Address at Wake Forest Law Review
Symposium: Agency Theory: Still Viable? (Mar. 22, 2013).
9. See generally JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAW OF AGENCY, AS
A BRANCH OF COMMERCIAL AND MARITIME JURISPRUDENCE, WITH OCCASIONAL
ILLUSTRATIONS FROM THE CIVIL & FOREIGN LAW (1839).
10. See generally FLOYD R. MECHEM, OUTLINES OF THE LAW OF AGENCY (2d
ed. 1903).
11. The American Casebook Series, around a century ago, for example,
included a volume on agency law. See, e.g., EDWIN C. GODDARD, CASES ON
PRINCIPAL AND AGENT SELECTED FROM DECISIONS OF ENGLISH AND AMERICAN
COURTS (1914). Interestingly, a more modern iteration of the American
Casebook Series features a text on broker-dealer regulation. See THOMAS LEE
HAZEN & DAVID L. RATNER, BROKER DEALER REGULATION (2003). Fortunately,
even if numerous students graduate law school today without a formal agency
course, they may still gain exposure to agency law principles in other courses,
such as business organizations. See, e.g., CHARLES R. T. O'KELLEY & ROBERT B.
THOMPSON, CORPORATIONS AND OTHER BUSINESS ASSOCIATIONS CASES AND
MATERIALS 20-49 (6th ed. 2010).
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Thus, they may provide insight not only into the vitality of agency
law for such entities but also broader knowledge about the
continued significance of agency principles in the modern economy.
Accordingly, this Article proceeds as follows. First, I introduce
financial intermediaries and their role in the modern economy.
Second, I explore agency-like relationships that are particularly
relevant for such intermediaries. Third, I use broker-dealer
regulation as a case study of a codification movement for the
regulation of intermediaries. Fourth, I explain why codification
should be viewed as complementing rather than supplanting
traditional agency law. And, finally, I examine issues raised by this
Article for future consideration.
I. FINANCIAL INTERMEDIARIES AND THE MODERN ECONOMCY
Financial intermediaries, in the most general sense, are firms
and individuals in the world of finance that help grease the wheels
of financial transactions. Financial professionals may do so in a
variety of ways. For example, they may help connect buyers and
sellers or provide liquidity to facilitate a transaction.
Securities brokers and dealers are classic examples of potential
intermediaries. Statutory definitions help illustrate the roles of
each. With some statutory variances, a broker is "any person
engaged in the business of effecting transactions in securities for the
account of others."12 By contrast, a dealer is "any person engaged in
the business of buying and selling securities for such person's own
account through a broker or otherwise." 13 One may see a firm called
a "broker-dealer," generally indicating that the firm meets both
definitions by effecting transactions for others as well as for its own
account.
Broker-dealers often are critical to a financial transaction. For
example, even when one individual wants to buy a stock and
another individual wants to sell it, without the help of securities
professionals they may not be able to find one another or the cost of
searching for each other on their own might create a prohibitively
high transactions cost. 1 4 This is why many individuals contact their
broker for assistance when they want to buy or sell a stock. On
exchanges, for example, certain individuals may stand ready as
specialists or market makers to take the other side of a transaction
12. Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 3(a)(4), 15 U.S.C. § 78c(a)(4) (2006).
13. Id. § 78c(a)(5).
14. Marketplaces, like stock exchanges, might further facilitate the
matching of buying and selling interests. Cf. JOHN R. Dos PASSOS, A TREATISE
ON THE LAW OF STOCK-BROKERS AND STOCK-EXCHANGES 6 (Greenwood Press
Reprinting 1968) (1882) (noting very early recognition of the value of
intermediaries in more general commercial transactions).
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when there is an imbalance of buyer and seller interests in
conducting a trade.15 The presence of securities firms, and thus
their impact on the economy, is quite large. For example, the
Financial Industry Regulatory Authority, Inc. ("FINRA") "is the
largest independent regulator of securities firms doing business
with the public in the United States."16 At the end of 2011, "FINRA
oversaw nearly 4,500 brokerage firms, approximately 160,000
branch offices and almost 630,000 registered securities
representatives."17 The need for so many individuals and firms to
help facilitate securities transactions is not surprising given how
common public participation now is for securities markets, whether
it be at an individual investor level or through pensions, mutual
funds, or other vehicles. Thus, it is hard to overstate the
significance of these intermediaries to the broader economy.
Not surprisingly, given the size of the securities business in the
United States, the financial intermediaries themselves are becoming
more complex business organizations. 18 This makes financial firms
especially interesting to study when considering broader agency
issues. While some financial firms may have begun as sole
proprietorships or partnerships, today one finds financial services
firms that are major corporations in their own rights. For example,
while Goldman Sachs was founded over 100 years ago, it has grown
into the Goldman Sachs Group, Inc., describing itself as "a leading
global investment banking, securities and investment management
firm that provides a wide range of financial services to a substantial
and diversified client base that includes corporations, financial
institutions, governments and high-net-worth individuals." 19 In its
2012 Annual Report, Goldman Sachs noted that for 2012 it had net
revenues of over $34 billion with a return on average common
15. Inside the NYSE: The Specialist, N.Y. STOCK EXCHANGE,
http://www.nyse.com/pdfs/specialistmagarticle.pdf (last visited June 3, 2013).
16. FIN. INDUS. REGULATORY AUTH., FINRA 2011 YEAR IN REVIEW AND
ANNUAL FINANCIAL REPORT 8 (2012), available at http://www.finra.org/web
/groups/corporate/@corp/@about/@ar/documents/corporate/pl27312.pdf.
17. Id.
18. See, e.g., JPMORGAN CHASE & CO., 2012 ANNUAL REPORT (2012),
available at http://files.shareholder.com/downloads/ONE/2650030280xOx652147
/a734543b-03fa-468d-89b0-fa5a9bld9e5f/JPMC_2012_AR.pdf (indicating array
of financial services and subsidiaries associated with the firm); see also Nicola
Cetorelli et al., The Evolution of Banks and Financial Intermediation: Framing
the Analysis, 18 FED. RES. BANK N.Y. EcoN. POL'Y REV., July 2012, at 1, 1-2
(explaining how financial intermediaries have become part of a complex,
decentralized process).
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shareholder equity of 10.7%.20 In 1999, Goldman Sachs became a
public company and by 2013 had 32,000 employees, a market
capitalization of $69 billion, and a full array of corporate governance
mechanisms such as 100% independent board committees, a proxy
voting process, and the ability of 25% of shareholders to call special
meetings.21
Although securities broker-dealers are examples of financial
intermediaries, they are not the only ones. Other financial
instruments have their own intermediaries. For instance, in the
futures world there are futures commission merchants who "solicit[]
or accept[] orders to buy or sell futures contracts, options on futures,
retail off-exchange forex contracts or swaps and accept[] money or
other assets from customers to support such orders." 22 In addition
to some intermediaries specializing in transactions in certain
instruments, financial, institutions can have their own trading desks
and sometimes operate in a relatively broad spectrum of activities.23
Given the variety and importance of financial intermediaries
and institutions in the United States, it is not surprising that some
have been scrutinized in the wake of the financial crisis and at times
alleged to have been involved in various scandals. It is hard to find
consensus on the causes of the financial crisis, but various groups
have tried to identify what, in their view, were the contributing
factors. For example, the National Commission on the Causes of the
Financial and Economic Crisis in the United States offered a take on
20. GOLDMAN SACHS GRP., INC., 2012 ANNUAL REPORT 2 (2013), available at
http://www.goldmansachs.com/investor-relations/financials/current/annual
-reports/2012-annual-report-files/annual-report-2012.pdf.
21. Governance at Goldman Sachs: Key Facts, GOLDMAN SACHS,
http://www.goldmansachs.com/investor-relations/corporate-governance
/corporate-governance-documents/governance-key-facts.pdf (last visited June 3,
2013).
22. Futures Commission Merchant (FCM), NAT'L FUTURES Ass'N,
http://www.nfa.futures.org/NFA-registration/femlindex.html (last visited June
3, 2013).
23. After passage of the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act, one saw an increasing
capability of financial services groups to engage in an array of financial
activities, although in the wake of the Dodd-Frank Act the continued ability to
do so in some instances may fall into question. See, e.g., Volcker Rule Resource
Center, SIFMA, http://www.sifma.org/issues/regulatory-reform/volcker-rule
/overview/ (last visited June 3, 2013). Moreover, it is worth noting that a
variety of financial regulators exist in the United States-from the Securities
Exchange Commission, to the Commodity Futures Trading Commission, to the
Federal Reserve Board, to others-to regulate an array of different types of
financial institutions and instruments, rendering the understanding of
intermediary regulation particularly complex.
630 [Vol. 48
FINANCIAL INTERMEDIARIES
the causes of the crisis in their 2011 final report, The Financial
Crisis Inquiry Report24:
While the vulnerabilities that created the potential for crisis
were years in the making, it was the collapse of the housing
bubble-fueled by low interest rates, easy and available credit,
scant regulation, and toxic mortgages-that was the spark
that ignited a string of events, which led to a full-blown crisis
in the fall of 2008. Trillions of dollars in risky mortgages had
become embedded throughout the financial system, as
mortgage-related securities were packaged, repackaged, and
sold to investors around the world. When the bubble burst,
hundreds of billions of dollars in losses in mortgages and
mortgage-related securities shook markets as well as financial
institutions that had significant exposures to those mortgages
and had borrowed heavily against them. This happened not
just in the United States but around the world. The losses
were magnified by derivatives such as synthetic securities.
The crisis reached seismic proportions in September 2008 with
the failure of Lehman Brothers and the impending collapse of
the insurance giant American International Group (AIG).
Panic fanned by a lack of transparency of the balance sheets of
major financial institutions, coupled with a tangle of
interconnections among institutions perceived to be "too big to
fail," caused the credit markets to seize up. Trading ground to
a halt. The stock market plummeted. The economy plunged
into a deep recession.
The financial system we examined bears little resemblance to
that of our parents' generation. The changes in the past three
decades alone have been remarkable. The financial markets
have become increasingly globalized. Technology has
transformed the efficiency, speed, and complexity of financial
instruments and transactions. There is broader access to and
lower costs of financing than ever before. And the financial
sector itself has become a much more dominant force in our
economy.
From 1978 to 2007, the amount of debt held by the financial
sector soared from $3 trillion to $36 trillion, more than
doubling as a share of gross domestic product. The very
nature of many Wall Street firms changed-from relatively
staid private partnerships to publicly traded corporations
taking greater and more diverse kinds of risks. By 2005, the
24. FIN. CRISIS INQUIRY COMM'N, THE FINANCIAL CRISIS INQUIRY REPORT: THE
FINAL REPORT OF THE NATIONAL COMMISSION ON THE CAUSES OF THE FINANCIAL
AND EcoNoMIC CRISIS IN THE UNITED STATES (2011). But cf. Bill Thomas et al.,
What Caused the Financial Crisis?, WALL ST. J., Jan. 27, 2011, at A21 (noting
dissent from the report).
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10 largest U.S. commercial banks held 55% of the industry's
assets, more than double the level held in 1990. On the eve of
the crisis in 2006, financial sector profits constituted 27% of all
corporate profits in the United States, up from 15% in 1980.
Understanding this transformation has been critical to the
Commission's analysis.25
Whether one exactly agrees with this narrative or not, it
certainly reflects concern among some about the role of financial
institutions and intermediaries in our economy. Such concern likely
will be exacerbated as litigation follows in the wake of the crisis and
as other scandals involving financial professionals emerge. For
example, media has focused on the incarceration of Bernard Madoff
after admissions related to an alleged Ponzi scheme. 26
In addition, after the "London Whale" trades, Congressional
investigators have focused on trading practices and engagement in
the derivatives market of one of America's biggest financial holding
companies, JPMorgan Chase & Company.27  A news release
associated with a hearing before the U.S. Senate Permanent
Subcommittee on Investigations, from Senator Carl Levin claimed:
The whale trades were conducted by traders in the London
office of the Chief Investment Office (CIO) of JPMorgan Chase
& Co., America's biggest bank and largest derivatives dealer.
The Subcommittee's investigation has determined that, over
the course of the first quarter of 2012, the CIO used its
Synthetic Credit Portfolio (SCP) to engage in high risk
derivatives trading; mismarked the trading book to hide
losses; disregarded multiple indicators of increasing risk;
manipulated risk models; dodged regulatory oversight; and
misinformed investors, regulators, and the public about the
nature of its risky derivatives trading. The Subcommittee's
investigation has exposed not only high risk activities and
abuses at JPMorgan Chase, but also broader, systemic
problems related to the valuation, risk analysis, disclosure,
and oversight of synthetic credit derivatives. 28
25. FIN. CRISIS INQUIRY COMM'N, supra note 24, at xvi-xvii.
26. See Diana B. Henriques & Jack Healy, Madoff Goes to Jail after Guilty
Pleas, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 12, 2009), http://www.nytimes.com/2009/03/13
Ibusiness/13madoff.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0.
27. See generally STAFF OF S. COMM. ON HOMELAND SEC. & GOV'T AFFAIRS,
PERMANENT SUBCOMM. ON INVESTIGATIONS, 113TH CONG., JPMORGAN CHASE
WHALE TRADES: A CASE HISTORY OF DERIVATIVES RISKS AND ABUSES (2013)
[hereinafter WHALE REPORT] (examining the risks associated with trading
practices in derivatives markets).
28. Senate Investigations Subcommittee Holds Hearing and Releases Report
on JPMorgan Chase Whale Trades, Newsroom, CARL LEVIN-U.S. SENATOR FOR
MICH. (Mar. 14, 2013), http://www.levin.senate.gov/newsroom/press/release
632 [Vol. 48
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Again, putting aside views of acceptance of individual inquiries,
the level of angst involving financial institutions and intermediaries
has real consequences. Recently, the author testified before
Congress regarding settlement practices of financial regulators after
a federal district court judge rejected a Securities and Exchange
Commission ("SEC') settlement with a major financial player,
indicating concern about whether the punishment was tough
enough. 29 While the Second Circuit at least temporarily stayed the
effects of the district court's action, 30 it raises the specter of what
other legal players might do if the angst continues or if the
perception that problems are not being sufficiently addressed
lingers. All of this makes it important to move forward to an inquiry
about the presence and importance of agency-like relationships for
financial intermediaries.
II. FINANCIAL INTERMEDIARIES AND AGENCY
Having seen the importance of and controversies related to
financial intermediaries, it is useful to explore the importance of
agency-like relationships to these financial intermediaries. 31 Such
relationships are multiple. One might be characterized as the entity
acting as the principal to its employees. Another might be one
where the client takes the role of the principal.
The first relationship is traditionally recognized as agency-like.
Financial entities have natural persons as their employees, thus
making those employees naturally capable of being characterized as
agents of the organization as principal. Notwithstanding the
traditional importance of duties between such agents and principals,
such relationships are potentially subject to problems. While
Senator Levin and his subcommittee's report on JPMorgan Chase
/senate-investigations-subcommittee-holds-hearing-and-releases-report-on-
jpmorgan-chase-whale-trades.
29. See Examining the Settlement Practices of U.S. Financial Regulators:
Hearing Before H. Comm. on Fin. Servs., 112th Cong. 48-56 (2012) (statement
of Kenneth M. Rosen); see also SEC v. Citigroup Global Mkts. Inc., 827 F. Supp.
2d 328, 335 (S.D.N.Y. 2011); see generally Kenneth M. Rosen, Examining the
Role of Settlements in the Enforcement Process by Financial Regulators:
The Example of the United States Securities and Exchange
Commission, COMMITTEE ON FIN. SERVICES (May 17, 2012),
http://financialservices.house.gov/uploadedfiles/hhrg- 1 12-baOO-wstate-krosen
-20120517.pdf.
30. SEC v. Citigroup Global Mkts. Inc., 673 F.3d 158, 160-61 (2d Cir.
2012).
31. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 1.01 cmt. c (2006) (explaining
that a fundamental agency relationship requires a person to act as a
representative or on behalf of another with power to affect the legal rights and
duties of the other).
6332013]
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and the whale trades explored problems at the entity,32 one might
view the situation as a problem of employee agents who go rogue
against the interests of the principal. The Whale Report offers
fascinating insight into apparent, specific agent activities related to
allegations, including increasing risk,33 hiding losses, 3 4 and
disregarding limits. 3 5
The traditional implications . of the entity as principal and
employee as agent can be great, for instance, as they relate to third
parties. This plays out in the classic case of Blackburn v. Witter.36
In that case a dairy farmer's widow began taking the advice of an
individual employed by a firm, Walston & Company. 37 That
employee eventually became a representative for another financial
firm, Dean Witter & Company, before getting discharged. 38 The
employee convinced the widow to invest in a fictitious company,
promising a better return than her existing investment in other
stocks he previously suggested. 39 The lower court ruled against the
two firms for the widow notwithstanding testimony indicating limits
placed on their employees' authority in such matters as well as stock
exchange and SEC limits. 4 0 The widow was not shown to know of
such limits, and the lower court reasoned that this was a situation of
ostensible authority despite the lack of actual authority, grounding
the liability of the firm for the employee's actions. 41 Ostensible
authority allows third parties to rely reasonably on their belief in
agency even if authority does not exist.42 On appeal, the firms tried
to argue that it was unreasonable for the widow to proceed as she
did, given things like the odd nature of receipts received.43 The
appellate court affirmed the judgment, relying heavily on the lower
court's factual findings.44 Whether one agrees with the court, the
potential implications of the finding of an agency relationship as
occurred here are clear-liability might ensue.
32. See supra notes 27-28 and accompanying text.
33. WHALE REPORT, supra note 27, at 35-95.
34. Id. at 96-153.
35. Id. at 153-214. The problem of possible rogue employees and risky
behavior does not appear to be limited to JPMorgan. See, e.g., Tom
Braithwaite & Kara Scannell, Corzine Blamed for MF Global Collapse, FIN.
TIMES, Apr. 5, 2013, at 13; Kara Scannell & Tom Braithwaite, Ex-Goldman
Trader Pleads Guilty in $8bn Fraud, FIN. TIMES, Apr. 4, 2013, at 15.
36. 19 Cal. Rptr. 842 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1962).
37. Id. at 842.
38. Id.
39. Id. at 842-43.
40. Id. at 843.
41. Id.
42. Id.
43. Id. at 844.
44. Id. at 844-46.
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Perhaps a more interesting agency-type relationship that might
be relevant for financial intermediaries is one where the client of the
firm is viewed as the principal and the firm is seen as her agent.
Interestingly, when brokers are sued at times for misconduct,
something known as the "shingle theory" might be applied. The idea
is that when one hangs a shingle indicating you are a professional
who serves the client, the client rightfully can have expectations of
fair treatment, and failure to live up to those expectations might be
deemed fraudulent.45  At least in the world of broker-dealer
relationships, where the scope of such theory is not entirely clear,
one might ask if fiduciary notions found in areas like agency law
might come into play as well.4 6
Given the arguable presence of agency-type relationships in the
world of financial intermediaries, it is useful to explore further the
nature of legal requirements on intermediaries.
III. CODIFICATION MOVEMENT
To better understand legal obligations of intermediaries it is
useful, as a case study, to focus on one type of intermediary, a
broker-dealer, and trends in the development of the regulatory
framework for them. 4 7 In particular, one can focus on the trend
towards codification under the federal securities laws.
The regulatory structure for broker-dealers is a complex one
that starts with a registration requirement under section 15 of the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934 for most who meet the definition of
broker or dealer.48  The complexity stems from the fact that
registration does not merely entail the submission of a form to the
SEC.49 Rather the registration requirement, when triggered,
indicates a broker-dealer is subject to a broader set of
requirements.50 For instance, the broker-dealer needs to become a
member of a self-regulatory organization ("SRO") like FINRA or a
registered national securities exchange. 51 Consequently, the
registered broker-dealer is not only subject to requirements directly
imposed by the SEC but also to rules of the SRO to which it
45. See COX ET AL., supra note 2, at 1027-30.
46. See id.
47. Given differences in how different types of financial intermediaries
handling different types of financial instruments are regulated, it is useful to
focus on a more manageable subset of broker dealers.
48. See Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 3, 15 U.S.C. § 78o (2006); Guide
to Broker-Dealer Registration, U.S. SEC. & EXCHANGE COMMISSION (Apr. 2008),
http://www.sec.gov/divisions/marketreg/bdguide.htm.
49. Guide to Broker-Dealer Registration, supra note 48 (following link on
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belongs. 52 Over the years, under significant codification efforts, the
rules of these SROs have proliferated to cover matters that can
become quite specific and extensive. 53 Issues such as treatment of
customers by broker-dealers as well as responsibilities of a firm for
its representatives have become more detailed. 54
The volume of rules is significant. As noted above, many of the
nation's broker-dealers belong to FINRA. FINRA actually emerged
as a consolidation of the regulatory efforts of the old National
Association of Securities Dealers regulatory body and the regulatory
arm of the New York Stock Exchange.55  That effort meant
incorporating not only rules from the two prior bodies but also
interpretive guidance of rules.56 Notwithstanding FINRA's creation
years ago, the rulebooks are still undergoing a consolidation process
as new rules continue to be promulgated.57 Moreover, there is the
possibility that additional SROs' duties might merge into FINRA.68
52. Because of SEC oversight over the self-regulatory organizations, the
system is arguably even more complex:
First, [the broker-dealer] is regulated by FINRA and any other SRO of
which it is a member. Second, it is regulated indirectly by the SEC,
through that agency's authority over the SROs. Third, it is regulated
directly by the SEC, through the Exchange Act's registration
requirement and SEC rules of conduct in a number of areas. Finally,
it is regulated by the securities laws ... of any state in which it does
business, to the extent that these laws are not preempted by the
federal securities laws. The regulatory overlap is mitigated, however,
by allocation of regulatory responsibility between the SEC and the
SROs, and among the various SROs.
NORMAN S. POSER & JAMES A. FANTO, BROKER-DEALER LAW AND REGULATION §
4.01[F] (4th ed. Supp. 2013) (footnotes omitted).
53. See, e.g., FINRA Rules, FINRA, http://finra.complinet.com/en/display
/display.html?rbid=2403&elementid=607 (last visited Sept. 21, 2013).
54. See 2000. Duties and Conflicts, FINRA, http://finra.complinet.com
/en/display/displaymain.html?rbid=2403&elementid=5502 (last visited Sept.
21, 2013); 3000. Supervision and Responsibilities Relating to Associated
Persons, FINRA, http://finra.complinet.comlen/display/displaymain.html?rbid
=2403&elementid=5664 (last visited Sept. 21, 2013). The rules can even get
into the details of items such as anti-money laundering compliance programs.
See 3310. Anti-Money Laundering Compliance Program, FINRA,
http://finra.complinet.comlen/display/display-main.html?rbid=2403&elementid
=8656 (last visited Sept. 21, 2013).
55. NASD and NYSE Member Regulation Combine to Form the Financial
Industry Regulatory Authority - FINRA, FINRA (July 30, 2007),
http://www.finra.org/Newsroom/newsreleases/2007/p036329.
56. See, e.g., Incorporated NYSE Rule Interpretations, FINRA,
http://finra.complinet.com/en/display/display-main.html?rbid=2403&elementid
=611 (last visited Sept. 21, 2013).
57. FINRA's Rulebook Consolidation Process, FINRA, http://www.finra.org
/Industry/Regulation/FINRARules/PO38095 (last visited June 4, 2013).




As one considers potentially even more voluminous and complex
rules, it is worthwhile to briefly note that things were not always
this way. In his 1882 treatise on brokers and exchanges, John Dos
Passos noted that while formal licensing was not required for
brokers, they tended not to be random folks off the street.59 Nor
were these brokers without common-law-like principles to guide
them. 6 0 Dos Passos noted the trustee-like nature of the broker, "for
the law charges him with the utmost honesty and good faith in his
transactions . ".. 61
However, the proliferation of SRO rules certainly has potential
benefits. These rules arguably provide guidance on right and wrong
behavior. Moreover, because they are SRO rules, the organization
can enforce them along with the SEC.62 In a way, this means that
the SEC can leverage enforcement resources of the SROs as it seeks
to police the markets. However, the proliferation of rules raises an
additional question: Do these rules supplement or supplant previous
behavioral norms for broker-dealers developed in other contexts,
such as agency law?
IV. SUPPLEMENTATION OR REPLACEMENT
In answering whether newly codified rules supplement or
supplant norms developed in agency law, it is useful to start by
recognizing that, at least sometimes, newly codified rules can
confuse seemingly well-settled issues. A useful example of this
comes in the form of a state law provision on corporate governance,
the charter option for statutory exculpation in Delaware. 63
Some will recall the controversy created when the Delaware
Supreme Court in Smith v. Van Gorkom64 clarified the potential for
liability for violations of a duty of care in a Board of Directors'
handling of a cash-out merger. In the wake of fears of liability
exposure, the Delaware legislature passed legislation that clarified
that a corporation had the option to include in its charter a provision
59. Dos PAssos, supra note 14, at 101-02.
60. Id. at 102-04.
61. Id. at 102.
62. See, e.g., SEC Sues Roberson Stephens Inc. for Profit Sharing in
Connection with 'Hot' IPOs, U.S. SEC. & EXCHANGE COMMISSION (Jan. 9, 2003),
http://www.sec.gov/news/press/2003-3.htm (noting settlement of matter pursued
by SEC and an SRO); see also Luis A. Aguilar, The Need for Robust SEC
Oversight of SROs, Public Statements, U.S. SEC. & EXCHANGE COMMISSION (May
8, 2013), http://www.sec.gov/news/speech/2013/spch050813laa.htm (describing
SEC oversight of SROs).
63. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 102(b)(7) (2011).
64. 488 A.2d 858 (Del. 1985), overruled on other grounds by Gantler v.
Stephens, 965 A.2d 695 (Del. 2009).
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exculpating directors from certain liability.65 However, while some
liability associated with some fiduciary duty breaches could be
eliminated under the charter option, not all could. The charter
option specifically did not permit removal of liability for certain
violations, such as violations of a duty of loyalty and acts not taken
in good faith.66
What ensued was an interesting jurisprudential adventure.
While specific fiduciary duties of care and of loyalty were well
established prior to the legislative changes, some wondered whether
the good faith language meant that a new, separate fiduciary duty of
good faith, apart from loyalty and care, had been created.67 Not
helping the speculation was Delaware court commentary during the
litigation surrounding compensation for former Disney President
Michael Ovitz. 68 As the litigation proceeded through the years, the
courts increasingly focused on the significance and meaning of good
faith and bad faith.69 The serious confusion created by the Disney
opinions is reflected in the speed with which the Delaware courts
seemingly engaged in a course correction. In Stone v. Ritter,70 the
Delaware Supreme Court explained:
This view of a failure to act in good faith results in . . .
additional doctrinal consequences. First, although good faith
may be described colloquially as part of a "triad" of fiduciary
duties that includes the duties of care and loyalty, the
obligation to act in good faith does not establish an
independent fiduciary duty that stands on the same footing as
the duties of care and loyalty. Only the latter two duties,
where violated, may directly result in liability, whereas a
failure to act in good faith may do so, but indirectly.7'
The episode is useful in that it shows how codification of issues
related to fiduciary duties-and rules related to fiduciary duties
that may find their foundation in agency law-can confuse as well
65. Tit. 8, § 102(b)(7).
66. Id.
67. See generally, e.g., Robert B. Thompson, The Short, but Interesting Life
of Good Faith as an Independent Liability Rule, 55 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 543
(2010/2011) (recounting the rise and fall of good faith as a separate fiduciary
duty).
68. See Kenneth M. Rosen, Mickey, Can You Spare a Dime? DisneyWar,
Executive Compensation, Corporate Governance, and Business Law Pedagogy,
105 MIcH. L. REV. 1151, 1157-60 (2007) (describing issues surround the Ovitz
compensation situation).
69. See, e.g., In re Walt Disney Co. Derivative Litig., 906 A.2d 27, 63-68
(Del. 2006); In re Walt Disney Co. Derivative Litig., 825 A.2d 275, 290-91 (Del.
Ch. 2003).
70. 911 A.2d 362 (Del. 2006).
71. Id. at 370.
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as clarify. In some ways the Delaware Supreme Court ultimately
reached a place where they worked with anything that might have
been in the exculpation statute to reconcile it with more traditional
notions of what fiduciary duties were generally considered to be.
This is a useful way of looking at agency law more generally as
it interacts with an increasingly codified world of broker-dealer
rules. Rather than viewing such rules as replacing traditional
agency notions, those who interpret the rules might respect the
continued relevance of agency law notions and perhaps even use
them to interpret the rules. This seems especially prudent if the
rules have some of their foundation in agency law concepts.
Some might object to this approach as a needless dual use of
belts and suspenders. In other words, if you have the codified rules
belt, you no longer need the suspenders of agency law concepts to
hold up the broker-dealer's pants. Yet, perceived redundancy is not
always a bad thing. Another story from the world of broker-dealers
is useful to illustrate this point and involves the introduction of
single-stock futures trading under the Commodity Futures
Modernization Act of 2000.72 Trading these futures was banned for
many years prior to the statute's enactment. 73 One of the challenges
of ending the ban was selection of an appropriate regulatory
framework for the product; more specifically, questions existed as to
whether single-stock futures should be treated as securities,
traditionally regulated by the SEC, or as futures, traditionally
regulated by the Commodity Futures Trading Commission
("CFTC").74
Some parties preferred earlier versions of legislation that
sought to bifurcate regulatory treatment of the products depending
on whether they traded on securities or futures exchanges.75
Moreover, there were questions as to the rules of the game for
intermediaries, such as broker-dealers and futures commission
merchants, who might engage in transactions in these new
products. 76 Representatives of the SEC expressed concerns related
to possible regulatory arbitrage opportunities and the potential for
72. See Commodity Futures Modernization Act of 2000, Pub. L. No. 106-
554, 114 Stat. 2763 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 7, 11, 12, & 15
U.S.C.).
73. See Single-Stock Futures Trading Ban May End, L.A. TIMES (May 9,
2000), http://articles.latimes.com/2000/may/09/business/fi-28014.
74. See William Neikirk, Gramm, Lugar Confident of Futures Bill Passage,
CHI. TRIB. (May 12, 2000), http://articles.chicagotribune.com/2000-05-12
Ibusiness/0005120282-1-single-stock-futures-commodity-futures-trading-
commission-senators.
75. MARK JICKLING, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RS20560, THE COMMODITY
FUTURES MODERNIZATION ACT (P.L. 106-554) 5 (2003).
76. Id.
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unequal investor protections on issues such as securities law
principles on customer protection issues, like suitability, depending
on the type of intermediary an investor used.77 Eventually, the
Chairs of the SEC and CFTC came up with a joint regulatory plan
for single-stock futures that largely went into the final enacted
version of the Commodity Futures Modernization Act. 78  The
products were treated as both securities and futures, and
intermediaries trading the products needed to register with both
agencies to submit themselves to the different regulatory schemes. 79
To limit administrative burdens of dual registration, special "notice"
registration was made available for these purposes.80 While some
might have viewed the dual registration requirement as redundant,
as "belts and suspenders," it helped insure that the fuller traditions
of customer protection from both the futures and securities worlds
were not lost while also trying to limit burdens imposed on
registrants. In the process, concerns that regulatory arbitrage
opportunities might otherwise exist were alleviated. A similar,
positive view could be taken of the use of traditional agency law
concepts of duties and responsibilities of principals and agents to
help fill gaps and to interpret codified rules related to financial
intermediaries.
V. FUTURE CONSIDERATIONS AND CONCLUSIONS
The above argument for the continued, if not increased,
relevancy of applying agency law principles in an evolving world of
intermediary regulation raises several items for future
consideration.
First, what would be the mechanics of using traditional agency
principles as suggested? On a basic level, this is not an entirely
novel enterprise. As a common law country, in the business law
area, we already have seen the migration of agency principles
through jurisprudence.81 Then state court Chief Justice Benjamin
Cardozo's famed opinion in Meinhard v. Salmon82 is often cited for
its notions about fiduciary duties in the contexts of various business
77. See Annette L. Nazareth, Testimony Concerning H.R. 4541, The
Commodity Futures Modernization Act of 2000, U.S. SEC. & EXCHANGE
COMMISSION (June 4, 2000), http://www.sec.gov/news/testimony/tsl02000.htm.
78. JICKLING, supra note 75.
79. News Story Supplement: Summary of SEC/CFTC Agreement, U.S. SEC.
& EXCHANGE COMMISSION, http://www.sec.gov/news/extra/cftcagre.htm (last
modified Sep. 19, 2000).
80. Id.
81. Indeed, that is why so many business organizations case books include
agency law sections-this enriches students understanding of other business
organizations law that draws on agency law principles.
82. 164 N.E. 545 (N.Y. 1928).
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organizations even though Justice Cardozo applied his ideas in a
specific context, a case about a joint venture.83 Moreover, Justice
Cardozo's opinion itself was not an entirely original exposition, but
instead drew on earlier principles as well.84 Of course, agency law
can be a foundational source for fiduciary concepts.
It is interesting if the ease of application found in the courts can
shift to other types of legal fora. This is significant in the securities
world, for instance, where arbitration is so frequently used for
customer disputes with broker-dealers. 85  To the extent that
arbitration is hailed for the ability of decision makers to act with
greater flexibility, perhaps arbitration might be even more suited for
an active reintroduction of agency law principles as cases are
considered.
Second, how do this paper's views on agency fit with ongoing
reform efforts? In the wake of scandals and the financial crisis,
regulatory reforms sometimes feel like they are introduced at
breakneck speed. I would draw attention to the author's previous
work counseling caution in enacting multiple reform efforts on
similar time frames without paying heed to potential regulatory
synergies. 86  That said, there already is an active, statutorily
mandated agenda-although it is one that agencies sometimes have
difficulty implementing on the prescribed time frames.87 One item
arising out of Dodd-Frank is the idea of new fiduciary standards for
investment advisers and broker-dealers. 88 My purpose in this paper
83. See Kenneth M. Rosen, Fiduciaries, 58 ALA. L. REV. 1041, 1041 n.2
(2007).
84. Id. at 1041-42.
85. See Barbara Black, How to Improve Retail Investor Protection After the
Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, 13 U. PA. J. Bus.
L. 59, 61 (2010) (noting almost all broker-dealers include predispute arbitration
agreements in customer agreements).
86. See generally, e.g., Kenneth M. Rosen, "Who Killed Katie Couric?" and
Other Tales from the World of Executive Compensation Reform, 76 FORDHAM L.
REV. 2907 (2008) (examining the ability of the reform processes of the SEC and
House of Representatives to yield positive reforms).
87. See generally, e.g., U.S. GOV'T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-13-195,
FINANCIAL REGULATORY REFORM: REGULATORS HAVE FACED CHALLENGES
FINALIZING KEY REFORMS AND UNADDRESSED AREAS POSE POTENTIAL RISKS (2013)
(explaining risks and delays regulators have encountered in implementing
Dodd-Frank reforms). President Barack Obama recently called on regulators to
complete implementation of reform provisions. See Readout of the President's
Meeting with Independent Financial Regulators, Office of the Press Secretary,
WHITE HOUSE (Aug. 18, 2013), http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press
-office/2013/08/19/readout-presidents-meeting-independent-financial-regulators.
88. See STAFF OF U.S. SEC. & ExCH. COMM'N, STUDY ON INVESTMENT
ADVISERS AND BROKER-DEALERS AS REQUIRED BY SECTION 913 OF THE DODD-
FRANK WALL STREET REFORM AND CONSUMER PROTECTION ACT COMMIsSIoN 110
(2011), available at http://www.sec.gov/news/studies/2011/913studyfinal.pdf;
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is not to express a final opinion in this ongoing debate. Rather, as
this issue continues to evolve, it is useful to note that involved
parties should ask what new standards might add to the existing
investor protection regime, including common law principles related
to investment advisers and broker-dealers, and, moreover, exercise
caution to avoid displacing useful, existing principles.
This raises a broader issue related to desires to codify more and
more issues in a burgeoning administrative state beyond the world
of financial regulation. When engaging in such endeavors, codifiers
should be mindful to utilize legal principles that are already in place
and to avoid instituting new confusion or undermining positive
principles.
In conclusion, it is helpful to turn back to the beginning and,
more broadly, to the subject matter of the symposium. Hopefully,
this paper provides grounds to continue recognition of agency
problems as well as traditional solutions even as new crises and
scandals emerge. In some ways perhaps by returning to
foundational concepts-which themselves seemed based on simpler
notions of doing what is right and avoiding what is wrong-we have
the opportunity to merge the old with new theories. To vary a
popular phrase, it might be useful to find some old wine-libations
that have developed a fuller, more complex structure over time-to
place in new bottles.
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